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FOREWORD
Central Asia is a key theater in the war on terrorism where
fragile new states are attempting to consolidate political power,
build legitimacy, and stoke economic development at the same time
that they face a range of threats with security forces badly in need
of reform. While the United States has recognized the pivotal role
of Central Asia and greatly expanded its activities there, this is a
new venue for America. U.S. policymakers are learning in stride as
they seek ways to both strengthen the Central Asian states and to
encourage them to undertake badly needed political reforms.
In this monograph, Elizabeth Wishnick builds on the analysis in
her important 2002 SSI study, Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central
Asia. She contends that by highlighting antiterrorism, the United
States addresses a symptom rather than the causes of instability in
Central Asia; thus it is contributing to the radicalization of political
opposition movements and discrediting both democratization
and the U.S. commitment to it. Instead, she argues, the United
States should do more to address the underlying human security
problems in Central Asia, which increase its vulnerability to terrorist
movements.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph to
help national security strategists better understand the complexities
of America’s security interests in Central Asia.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Support for continuing operations in Afghanistan and for
antiterrorism has been the driving force for the strengthening of
American security cooperation with Central Asia. This monograph
1) explores the military rationale for U.S. security interests in Central
Asia; 2) examines the impact of the Iraq war on the sustainability
of U.S. forward basing in Central Asia; 3) evaluates the broader
consequences for U.S. foreign policy of an American military
presence in Central Asia; and 4) assesses the implications for the
U.S. Army.
The U.S.-led war in Iraq has introduced new complications into
security cooperation between the United States and Central Asia and
revealed inconsistencies in the U.S. approach to regional security.
The increased U.S. security focus on the region has led other regional
powers--especially Russia, China, and India--to compete for inﬂuence
there more overtly, and a continued American military presence is
likely to create tensions in Russian-American relations in particular.
Central Asian leaders concerned about the implications of the U.S.
interest in “regime change” for their own rule, now have an added
incentive to overstate terrorist threats facing their countries, while
justifying the persecution of any political opposition and peaceful
religious activity.
By highlighting antiterrorism in U.S. security cooperation with
Central Asia, the United States addresses a symptom, rather than the
causes of regional security; thus it is pursuing a counterproductive
strategy, contributing to the radicalization of political opposition
movements and discrediting both democratization and the U.S.
commitment to it. Instead, the United States should do more to
address the underlying human security problems in the region,
which increase its vulnerability to terrorist movements. To this end,
the U.S. Army should contribute to humanitarian demining efforts
and expand training in drug interdiction there.
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STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRAQ WAR:
U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA REASSESSED
Almost three years since 9/11 and the October 2001 war in
Afghanistan, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia shows
no signs of diminishing. To the contrary, the U.S. military has
been consolidating existing forward basing in Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan, and maintaining its contingency access to the Almaty
and Dushanbe airports. Support for continuing operations in
Afghanistan and anti-terrorism have been the driving forces for the
strengthening of American security cooperation with Central Asia.
This monograph will 1) explore the military rationale for U.S. security
interests in Central Asia; 2) examine the impact of the Iraq war on
the sustainability of U.S. forward basing in Central Asia; 3) evaluate
the broader consequences for U.S. foreign policy of an American
military presence in Central Asia; and 4) assess the implications for
the U.S. Army.
The U.S.-led war in Iraq has introduced new complications
into security cooperation between the United States and Central
Asia and revealed inconsistencies in the U.S. approach to regional
security. The increased U.S. security focus on Central Asia has led
other regional powers—especially Russia, China, and India—to
compete for inﬂuence in the region more overtly, and a continued
American military presence is likely to create tensions in RussianAmerican relations in particular. Concerned about the implications
of the U.S. interest in “regime change” for their own rule, Central
Asian leaders now have an added incentive to overstate terrorist
threats facing their countries, while justifying the persecution of any
political opposition and peaceful religious activity.
Moreover, by highlighting anti-terrorism in U.S. security
cooperation with Central Asia, the United States addresses a
symptom, rather than the causes of regional security, and is
pursuing a counterproductive strategy, contributing to the
radicalization of political opposition movements and discrediting
both democratization and the U.S. commitment to it. Instead, the
United States should do more to address the underlying human
security problems in Central Asia, which increase its vulnerability to
terrorist movements. To this end, the U.S. Army should contribute
1

to humanitarian demining efforts and expand training in drug
interdiction in the region.
BACKGROUND
To support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the U.S. military
acquired temporary forward basing rights in Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan as well as access to airspace and restricted use of bases
in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. All the Central Asian states offered
to share intelligence, and U.S. security cooperation with the region
has increased substantially since 9/11, involving high-level visits,
funding, and training.
After Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Tashkent
on October 5, 2001, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with U.S.
ofﬁcials allowing approximately 1,500 American military personnel
to operate out of the Karshi Khanabad airbase in exchange for
security guarantees and U.S. agreement to target training camps in
Afghanistan known to harbor the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.1
The agreement also provided for intelligence sharing and U.S. use of
Uzbekistan’s airspace. By the Karimov government’s request, aircraft
based at Khanabad were to be used primarily for humanitarian and
search-and-rescue attacks.2 The airbase also coordinates air trafﬁc
control for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.3
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Uzbekistan have
been cooperating closely, and in December 2001, ﬁve Uzbek
representatives were posted there.4 During CENTCOM Commanderin-Chief General Tommy Frank’s visit to Uzbekistan in January 2002,
CENTCOM and the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan signed an
agreement to develop military-to-military cooperation through joint
seminars, training, and partnerships with U.S. units.5 In March 2002,
the United States and Uzbekistan signed a strategic partnership: in
exchange for allowing the United States to remain in Uzbekistan
as long as necessary to complete antiterrorism operations in
Afghanistan, the United States would “regard with grave concern
any external threat to Uzbekistan.”6
Uzbekistan has played an important role in supplying economic
assistance to Afghanistan. Since the beginning of hostilities, more
2

than 300,000 tons of humanitarian aid reached Afghanistan from
Uzbek territory. Uzbekistan also has been supplying its neighbor
with electric power and liqueﬁed gas. In May 2003, Uzbekistan
offered to provide logistical and medical assistance to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Afghanistan, in
addition to helping with humanitarian aid deliveries.7 Germany, a
participant in the NATO peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, also
continues to operate an air base in Termez, near the border with
Afghanistan, and stations 150 troops there.
In contrast to the largely secret agreements the U.S. military
concluded with Uzbekistan, on December 5, 2001, the U.S.
Department of State and Kyrgyz ofﬁcials signed a basing access
agreement, allowing U.S. forces to use Manas airport, renamed the
Peter Ganci airbase in honor of the New York City ﬁre chief who
perished in the attacks on the World Trade Center. The agreement
allowed for basing rights for Western forces for a 1-year period.8 The
agreement was then prolonged for a second year, and on June 5,
2003, Kyrgyzstan committed to a 3-year extension. Approximately
1,300 U.S. and South Korean troops and 300 Kyrgyz civilians work at
the base, which sends aerial tankers to Afghanistan daily, as well as
regular transport of food, medical supplies, equipment, ammunition,
and coalition troops into Afghanistan.9 Kyrgyzstan has posted ﬁve
representatives at CENTCOM since May 14, 2002. The country has
played a key role, along with Tajikistan and Russia, in supplying
wheat and ﬂour to northern Afghanistan under the auspices of the
United Nations (UN) World Food Program.10
Because weather problems at times disrupt use of the Ganci
airbase, on July 10, 2002, the United States and Kazakhstan signed
a memorandum of understanding regarding use of the Almaty
airport for emergency landings. Kazakhstan also provided
overﬂight rights and has allowed transshipments over its territory
of supplies destined for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.11 While the
Kazakh Foreign Minister has denied that there would be any
permanent U.S. military presence, the United States has increased its
assistance for training and equipment for Kazakhstan’s military and
is renovating a military base at Atyrau in the Caspian Sea to improve
the security of the country’s energy infrastructure.12 In September
2003, CENTCOM and the Kazakhstan Emergency Situations Agency
3

organized an international conference to strengthen the detection,
prevention, and elimination of emergency situations in Central
Asia, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).13 Three representatives from Kazakhstan have
been at CENTCOM since June 2002.
Tajikistan allowed the Pentagon (and later the French military)
to use the Dushanbe airport on a contingency basis, mostly for
refueling, and granted the United States overﬂight rights.14 France
deployed transport aircraft to Dushanbe for use in humanitarian
assistance and other airlift support. Some 60 percent of international
assistance to Afghanistan’s power industry is shipped via Tajikistan.
Since March 2003 the Tajik Ministry of Defense also has been
providing some training for the new Afghan Army.15
U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA
In testimony to Congress in October 2003, Assistant Secretary
for European and Eurasian Affairs A. Elizabeth Jones stated that the
United States currently has three sets of security interests in Central
Asia: 1) security (antiterrorism, nonproliferation, combating drug
trafﬁcking); 2) energy (ensuring reliable and economically viable
access to global markets and the use of energy revenues to promote
sustainable development); and 3) internal reform (including
democratization and market-oriented changes). The Assistant
Secretary emphasized that since 9/11 U.S. strategic interests in
Central Asia have focused on antiterrorism, especially the elimination
of the inﬂuence of terrorist and other destabilizing groups. She also
noted that the Central Asian states continue to provide critical air
support to U.S. antiterrorism operations in Afghanistan.16
In recognition of the importance of Central Asia to U.S.
antiterrorism goals, these countries have seen their share of Freedom
Support Act funding increase at a time of decline in assistance to
Eurasia as a whole. Thus, cumulative aid to Central Asia FY1992FY2002 amounted to $2.76 billion, or 12 percent of total Freedom
Support funds for that period, but the $157 billion in aid requested
for Central Asia in FY2004 represents 27 percent of the total Freedom
Support Act request for the current year.17 According to the State
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Department, these funds are essential “to sustain efforts begun in
the wake of the September 11 attacks to enhance long-term stability
in these key front-line states.”18 (Freedom Support programs
in the security area include law enforcement, export controls,
nonproliferation, and redirection of nuclear scientists and weapons
experts to civilian occupations.)
In addition to Freedom Support Act funds, the Central Asian
states receive additional antiterrorism assistance from a range of
other agencies, including the Department of Defense (DoD), as well
as through other State Department programs. The latter include
Foreign Military Financing (providing grants for purchases of U.S.
military equipment, as well as training in counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency, and other services to support interoperability in
the Partnership for Peace Program), International Military Training
and English (funding for English language instruction and other
training for Central Asian militaries) and Non-Proliferation, AntiTerrorism, De-Mining and Related Programs (supporting export
controls and border security assistance).

Kaz.

Kyr.

Taj.

Uzb.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

2.9

3.9

0

8.6

International Military Education and
Training (IMET)

0.872

1.1

0.34

1.1

Non-Proliferation, AntiTerrorism,
De-Mining, and Related Programs
(NADR)

8.5

2.5

0.55

3.9

Freedom Support Act Security
Programs

4.98

2.5

0.42

3.9

Source: U.S. Department of State, http: www.state.gov.

Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia in FY2003
(in millions of US$).
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MILITARY RATIONALE
The military rationale for U.S. security interests in Central Asia
follows from new approaches to U.S. national security strategy,
developments in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. Central Asian
bases are likely to take on increased strategic importance in the
context of ongoing reassessments of U.S. basing policy.
U.S. National Security Strategy.
The October 2001 U.S. DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
advocated a capabilities-based strategy and emphasized the
importance of preparing forward deployed forces for a variety of
contingencies worldwide. It did this by expanding basing options
beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia and by securing
temporary access to facilities for training and exercises in areas where
the United States lacks bases. The QDR also called for strengthening
U.S. alliances and partnerships by increasing peacetime training and
preparations for coalition operations.
Building on the themes outlined in the QDR, the U.S National
Security Strategy published in August 2002 advocates a preemptive
strategy because it “is not possible to defend against every threat, in
every place, at every conceivable time. The only defense is to take
the war to the enemy. The best defense is a good offense.”19 The
document summarizes many of the general principles underlying
U.S. security interests, which clearly are underpinning U.S.
diplomatic overtures and military engagement with Central Asia:
preventing the hostile domination of key areas and preserving a
stable balance of power; maintaining access to key markets and
strategic resources; addressing threats from territories of weak states
and ungoverned areas; preventing the diffusion of weapons to nonstate actors; sustaining coalitions; and preparing to intervene rapidly
in unexpected crises.
What this means speciﬁcally for U.S. security interests in Central
Asia is clariﬁed in the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 annual report
to Congress. The report states that “an arc of instability” spans
from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, including weak states that
are vulnerable to radical movements. Although emphasizing the
6

importance of safeguarding stability in Asia, the report acknowledges
that “the density of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure is lower
in Asia than in other critical regions.”20 Consequently the United
States must place a priority on securing additional basing access and
signing infrastructure agreements with key states and on developing
new forms of security cooperation.
More than 2 years since the attacks against the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, the war against terrorism continues to be the focal
point of U.S. foreign policy. As President Bush emphasized in his
State of the Union address on January 20, 2004, homeland defense
and worldwide antiterrorism operations remain key American
priorities.21 The antiterrorism strategy outlined by the White House
in February 2003 highlighted the importance of creating new
partnerships with those willing and able to pool resources to defeat
terrorism.22 In this policy context, where antiterrorism efforts occupy
pride of place in American foreign policy, security cooperation with
Central Asian states is focused on addressing challenges from
domestic and foreign terrorist threats to these countries.
The U.S. Army Transformation Roadmap notes that the national
security strategy places considerable demands on the American
military.23 Making virtue out of a necessity, at a time when Army
resources are straining to cope with current missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker has
portrayed strategic agility as a key aim.24 U.S. basing access in
Central Asia enables American forces to react quickly in case of
terrorist threats or other crises in the region. “Operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have brought home an important lesson--speed matters,”
the Secretary of Defense’s 2003 report to Congress concludes.25
Developments in Afghanistan and U.S. Basing in Central Asia.
Central Asian leaders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan
provided support for the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan due
to their own concerns over the potential for instability caused by
the Taliban’s support for Islamic movements within their borders.
They especially were troubled by the armed radical organization,
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), then based in northern
Afghanistan, and reportedly linked to al-Qaeda. The IMU was
7

implicated in bombings in February 1999 in Tashkent that nearly
killed President Karimov and led armed incursions into Kyrgyzstan
in July-August 1999. After further IMU attacks in Uzbekistan in
August 2000 during which several Americans were held hostage, in
September 2000 the State Department included the IMU in its list of
foreign terrorist organizations.26
During the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, the IMU
leader, Namangani, was believed to have been killed, and the
organization’s activities were disrupted.27 Nevertheless, in July
2003, Kyrgyzstan’s National Security Service Deputy Chairman
Tokon Mamytov reported that the IMU had received $400,000
from international terrorist organizations to fund actions in Central
Asia. He claimed that the IMU had already joined Uighur groups
in establishing a united Islamic Movement of Turkestan and was
seeking to establish ties with Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami (The Party of
Islamic Liberation). While Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a nonviolent political
party, it is banned throughout Central Asia due to the group’s aim to
reestablish the Caliphate and reunite all Muslim lands under Islamic
rule.28
U.S. ofﬁcials also believe that the IMU is regrouping, despite
its losses in Afghanistan. At a December 2003 press conference,
U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Steven Young called the group
the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the Central Asian region. He
noted that U.S. security cooperation with Kyrgyzstan should be
able to counter IMU terrorist activities in the country, and that the
U.S. military presence there would remain as long as necessary to
address the ongoing terrorist threat in Afghanistan.29
The United States declared the end of major combat operations in
Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, paving the way for a greater emphasis
on reconstruction, although antiterrorist operations are continuing.
Secretary Rumsfeld has stated that the reconstruction of Afghanistan
could be a laboratory for reconstruction in Iraq, and thus support
from Central Asian bases for such efforts will continue to be highly
important. Since the conclusion of the war in Afghanistan, U.S.
forward basing in Central Asia has played a key role in supporting
U.S. efforts to combat remaining pockets of opposition and terrorist
operations, establish stability, promote reconstruction, and provide
humanitarian aid.
8

The United States still has approximately 11,000 troops in
Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Since
August 11, 2003, NATO has taken on its ﬁrst mission outside Europe
and has assumed command of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), the 5,500-strong international peacekeeping force
established under a UN mandate. Former NATO Secretary-General
Lord Robertson noted that NATO would play a key role in assisting
Central Asia to combat terrorist threats once it assumed leadership
of the peacekeeping force.30
While NATO agreed to expand ISAF’s activities beyond Kabul,
thus far just one provincial reconstruction team has been dispatched.
In January 2004 a team of 170 German troops was sent to Kunduz in
northern Afghanistan, although the U.S.-led coalition also operates
teams in several other cities. U.S. forces provide logistical assistance
and training for the Afghan military, but they do no engage in
peacekeeping.31 NATO has been under pressure both to expand
signiﬁcantly its peacekeeping operations across Afghanistan and to
take over antiterrorist operations from the United States. A decision
on NATO’s future role in Afghanistan is expected at the June 2004
summit in Istanbul.32
While new NATO commander Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has pledged
to make Afghanistan a priority for the Alliance, his predecessor faced
considerable difﬁculty in obtaining sufﬁcient troop contributions.33
In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Marine
Corps General James Jones noted that more than 5,500 troops would
be required to expand the peacekeeping effort, but the Alliance
had yet to decide how to pay for them, transport them, or maintain
them.34 Former UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi contended that
as many as 10,000 more troops would be necessary to expand the
NATO force beyond Kabul, a step UN Secretary General Koﬁ Annan
has been urging for the past 2 years.35
Pockets of resistance from Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants
remain throughout Afghanistan. Military engagements and rebel
attacks occur periodically, as U.S. Special Forces continue to hunt
for remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda units.36 There is evidence that
as many as 5,000 ﬁghters, possibly including Osama Bin Laden
himself, may have ﬂed to western Pakistan, where a pro-Taliban
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coalition of Islamic parties, the Mattahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),
was elected in October 2002. Linked by ethnic ties--both the Taliban
and these provincial leaders are from the Pushtun ethnic group---as
well as anti-Americanism and opposition to the Karzai government
in Afghanistan, the new provincial coalition is believed to be
providing sanctuary and support to the Taliban, now feared to be
regrouping.37
Since late 2002, the Bush administration and Afghanistan’s
President Hamid Karzai have been more openly critical of Pakistan’s
role in the war against terrorism. In January 2003 U.S. Ambassador
to Islamabad Nancy Powell called Pakistan “a platform for
terrorism.”38 U.S. military commanders have complained about the
slow progress in cooperating with Pakistan in the search for fugitives
across the border from Afghanistan. In April 2003 President Karzai
presented President Musharraf with a list of Taliban commanders
allegedly using Pakistan as a base for guerrilla operations against
Afghanistan.39 Tensions increased between Kabul and Islamabad in
the summer and fall of 2003 as members of the Karzai government
accused Pakistani ofﬁcials of tacit support for the Taliban and other
Islamic militants seeking to destabilize Afghanistan.40 Musharraf,
who has faced a series of death threats including two in December
2003 alone, has been under intense pressure from militant Islamists
in Pakistan for his support for the U.S.-led war against the Taliban
and now for his scrutiny of the role of Pakistani scientists in nuclear
proliferation to Iran. In late September 2003, al-Qaeda issued a death
threat against the Pakistani leader, and in a taped message, Osama
bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahari, called for Muslims in
Pakistan to “uproot” Musharraf for his betrayal of their interests.41
Nevertheless, in January 2004, Pakistani Prime Minister Zafarullah
Khan Jamali visited Kabul for the ﬁrst time since the fall of the
Taliban and pledged to improve cooperation with Afghanistan on
antiterrorism.42
The security of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan
also is important to efforts to reduce narcotics trafﬁcking, an
important revenue source for terrorist groups. The opium grown in
Afghanistan and trafﬁcked through Pakistan supplies 70 percent of
the heroin sold in Europe and 40 percent of that sold in the United
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States.43 Despite ongoing U.S.-Pakistani cooperation against narcotics
trafﬁcking, drug control remains an uphill battle due to corruption
implicating Pakistani intelligence services, the difﬁculty in policing
the border with Afghanistan, and the postwar resumption of opium
production in that country. Afghanistan produced 3,400 tons of
opium in 2002 and is now the world’s leading source of opium.44
Despite President Karzai’s imposition of a decree in January 2002
banning the cultivation, trafﬁcking and abuse of opiates, opium
production increased by 6 percent and poppy cultivation by 8 percent
in 2003. While the UN, Great Britain, and other donors are assisting
Afghanistan to implement a strategy banning opium cultivation
within 10 years, currently the drug accounts for more than half of
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) of $4.4 billion.45
The difﬁculty of establishing security on Afghanistan’s borders
points to a more fundamental problem: the central government
under President Karzai has yet to establish effective control over
the entire country, which continues to be threatened by warlordism
and political disintegration. U.S. military and ﬁnancial support for
regional commanders during the 2001 war served to strengthen
these leaders and, even after the Taliban’s ouster, they continue
to undermine central government authority.46 While the warlords
have access to customs revenues, the central government remains
underfunded, compounding its weakness and reducing its public
support. Despite American military efforts to stabilize southern
Afghanistan, aid workers deem the region to insecure to visit.
Moreover, this region has been impoverished by persistent droughts,
prompting residents to choose opium production over livestock
herding.47
In recognition of the continuing security problems in southern
and eastern Afghanistan, in December 2003 Lieutenant General
David Barno, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan,
announced that American troops will be deployed to those areas in
provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). While the PRTs previously
distributed emergency relief, now they will focus on improving
security by patrolling, training the local police and Afghan security
forces. Twelve PRTs will be in place by March 2004.48
Although the deployment of PRTs and the loya jirga’s (grand
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tribal council) approval of Afghanistan’s new constitution on
January 4, 2004, will contribute to the consolidation of control by the
Karzai government, the Iraq war is diverting international attention
(and funds) away from the country’s needs. President Bush’s $87
billion aid package for Iraq and Afghanistan allocated just $1.2
billion for security and reconstruction in Afghanistan, only $800
million of which is new money.49 Moreover, the U.S. Government
spends nearly ten times that amount--$11 billion--to maintain
American forces in Afghanistan.50 Members of Congress, the UN,
and the Karzai government have been highly critical of what they
view as inadequate U.S. efforts thus far to assist Afghanistan’s
recovery.51 Indeed, the inability to stabilize Afghanistan serves to
compound doubts that the much more complex tasks involved in
achieving a secure and economically functional Iraq are likely to be
achieved successfully. As one observer noted, “Afghanistan was not
supposed to be simply a dress rehearsal for the invasion of Iraq. It
was meant to be a premiere, the blueprint for how to rescue a failed
state without colonizing it.”52
The War in Iraq and U.S. Forward Basing Strategy.
After the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq, Secretary
Rumsfeld announced future changes in U.S. basing in the Middle
East, including the withdrawal of troops from Saudi Arabia, the shift
of the major air operations center from Saudi Arabia to Qatar, and
the withdrawal of attack and support aircraft from Turkey.
The U.S. military has sought to relocate its combat air operations
center from Saudi Arabia for some time, due to restrictions placed
on operations originating there and concerns over the security of
American troops stationed at the Prince Sultan base. The United
States began using the al-Udeid base in Qatar on September 29,
2001, to position aircraft for use in the war in Afghanistan. In early
2002 the Air Force built a back-up command center at the base, in
case Saudi Arabia refused to allow the United States to direct its Iraq
installations from the Prince Sultan base. Initially used to direct air
operations in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa, al-Udeid now
directs all regional missions. CENTCOM also established a regional
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command post at Sayliya in Qatar, and the heavy equipment
prepositioned there was shipped to Kuwait and then used in the
Third Infantry Division’s invasion of Iraq.53
On April 29, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld and Prince Sultan bin
Abdul Aziz held a news conference broadcast on Saudi television,
announcing the withdrawal of the 5,000 American troops stationed
there since the ﬁrst Gulf War in 1991. With the demise of Saddam
Hussein’s regime, the U.S. rationale for its military mission in
Saudi Arabia ended. Only a small training program involving
approximately 500 American soldiers will remain near Riyadh.
Despite the long-standing security relationship between the United
States and Saudi Arabia dating to World War II, increasingly Saudi
leaders have seen the American military presence as a political
liability. They claimed they would initiate democratic reforms upon
the U.S. departure and, in fact, in October 2003 the Saudi government
announced its intention to organize elections for local councils.
Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar depends on U.S. security guarantees and
has welcomed the increased U.S. military presence on its territory.54
The changes in U.S. basing in the Middle East, particularly in
light of recent tensions between the United States and Turkey over
the use of bases to support military operations in Iraq, could lead
to a reappraisal of the role of Central Asian bases in U.S. policy
towards the Middle East. Some have speculated that the United
States might seek more permanent basing in Central Asia to
support ongoing operations in Afghanistan,55 a move likely to evoke
opposition in Russia, as well as in China and Iran. Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith has noted that post-Cold War
conﬂicts require rapidly deployable forces since forward-deployed
forces are not likely to be ﬁghting where they are located. Citing the
war in Afghanistan as an example of global power projection, Feith
described how forces from bases in Europe and Asia used Central
Asia as a beachhead for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.56
In general, the focus of U.S. basing strategy has shifted east,
opening discussion of the merits of maintaining long-standing
commitments to stationing forces in Western Europe and inviting
speculation about new opportunities for basing in the Balkans,
perceived as more convenient for operations in the Middle East.
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Since 9/11, the U.S. military has reinvigorated its basing presence
in a number of countries, including Pakistan, the Philippines, and
Singapore, to support antiterrorism operations and other strategic
goals in the Middle East.
Assuming a pro-American regime takes over Iraq in 2004-05,
some speculation exists that the Pentagon may seek basing rights
in Iraq. The Bagdad international airport, Tallil near An Nasiriyah
in southern Iraq, the H-1 airstrip in the western desert, and the
Bashur airﬁeld in the Kurdish north have been mentioned among
possible basing options.57 Nevertheless, the political costs are likely
to outweigh the military beneﬁts of such a move---U.S. basing in Iraq
could undermine the new government’s efforts to achieve autonomy
from the United States and may not be militarily necessary given
other basing access in the region.
THE IRAQ WAR AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF U.S.
BASING IN CENTRAL ASIA
Opposition to U.S. military intervention in Iraq may serve
to undermine regional support for continued U.S. basing in
Central Asia. With the exception of Uzbekistan, the Central Asian
governments expressed concern that their military cooperation with
the United States could lead them to be dragged into the conﬂict with
Iraq and inﬂame domestic tensions as a result. Nevertheless, these
governments have used the Iraq War, like the war on terrorism, as
a pretext for further crackdowns against political opposition and
Islamic activity.
Central Asian Views of the Iraq War.
With the exception of Uzbekistan, Central Asian leaders
were critical of the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq because
of its potentially adverse impact on support for radical Islamic
movements and terrorist groups within the region. Like other oil
producers, some of Kazakhstan’s initial concerns about U.S. military
intervention in Iraq stemmed from fears that Iraqi oil would ﬂood
the market, lowering the price. In a March 2003 poll of residents
of 10 major urban areas conducted by the Kazakh Association of
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Sociologists and Political Scientists, 83.5 percent of respondents
were against war in Iraq. Of those opposing intervention, 25 percent
stated that they believed that the United States aimed to control Iraqi
oil.58 Kazakh military ofﬁcials also feared that stray missiles or rogue
aircraft could place their country at risk. Kazakhstan’s air defenses
were placed on alert during the Iraq war, and in one instance a U.S.
plane was denied the right to ﬂy through Kazakh air space from
Karshi Khanabad to Ganci because it lacked proper authorization.59
Ofﬁcials in Kyrgyzstan, a strong advocate of the primacy of the
UN in conﬂict resolution, were concerned that the United States
would seek to use the Ganci airbase to support operations in Iraq,
provoking renewed terrorist activities in the region and destabilizing
of the fragile peace in Afghanistan.60 In the weeks leading up to the
U.S. decision to intervene, some antiwar demonstrations took place
in Kyrgyzstan, tacitly supported by the government, according to
some reports.61 The Kyrgyz parliament issued a statement on March
24, 2003, calling U.S. intervention in Iraq a violation of international
law and appealing to the Bush administration to resolve the crisis in
the UN Security Council. International Affairs Committee Chairman
Alisher Abdimomunov noted that Kyrgyz ofﬁcials were afraid that
their country could get dragged into the conﬂict if planes based at
Manas were sent to Iraq.62 Although the American base commander
insisted that Ganci was used exclusively to support the international
antiterrorism coalition in Afghanistan, suspicions about U.S.
intentions for use of Ganci may have contributed to Kyrgzystan’s
decision to grant Russia basing rights.
In Kyrgyzstan’s more open society, some prominent opposition
politicians, such as Topchubek Turgunaliev, head of the Erkindik
Party, criticized the Kyrgyz government’s opposition to the U.S.led war in Iraq, which he viewed as a war of liberation against a
despotic regime, a process he saw as equally necessary in Central
Asia.63 Nevertheless a poll by Expert in Bishkek and Osh in March
2003 revealed pervasive distrust of U.S. motives in the Iraq War,
with 42 percent attributing the American military intervention to
Washington’s interest in controlling Iraqi oil, and 14 percent stating
that the action was taken to reinforce U.S. authority in the world.
Some 66 percent of urban residents wanted their country to remain
neutral.64
15

Like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan’s leaders feared a resurgence of
Islamic radicalism and terrorist activities in Afghanistan as a result
of the Iraq war. Given the precarious balance between religion and
secularism achieved by Tajikistan’s coalition government since the
civil war ended in 1997, U.S. intervention in Iraq had the potential
to destabilize the domestic situation in Tajikistan as well.65 Both
countries also stood to lose international assistance, as international
attention was diverted by major reconstruction tasks in Iraq.66 Tajik
President Imomali Rakhmonov called for a rapid end to hostilities in
Iraq for fear of a new humanitarian crisis in the region.67
Although Uzbekistan refrained from providing any military
support for the U.S.-led war in Iraq, Uzbek media consistently
reinforced American positions regarding Iraq’s possession of WMD.
Ironically, the authoritarian regime in Tashkent cited Saddam’s
Hussein’s despotic rule and human rights abuses as a further
rationale for military intervention in Iraq.68 In a meeting of the U.S.Uzbekistan Security Council in April, Uzbek ofﬁcials offered to help
with reconstruction in Iraq.
While public opinion in Kazakhstan opposed the war, after
the U.S. invasion President Narsultan Nazarbaev was quick to
praise American efforts in the war against terrorism. Kazakhstan
became the ﬁrst Central Asian country to send a peacekeeping unit:
on August 20, 2003, 27 of its citizens traveled to Iraq to help with
demining and water extraction, Kazakhstan’s ﬁrst peacekeeping
mission ever.69 The Kazakh government is considering increasing
this force.
After the conclusion of major hostilities in Iraq, Central Asians
remain skeptical about the beneﬁts of the Iraq war for the Iraqi
people and especially for themselves. A June-July 2003 State
Department poll of urban residents in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan showed little optimism about the broader
regional consequences of the war. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan, more respondents stated they did not believe the Iraq
war would result in regional stability (46 percent in Kazakhstan,
42 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 31 percent in Tajikistan, while just
29 percent, 27 percent, and 10 percent, respectively, saw improved
prospects for stability in the Near East). Respondents in Uzbekistan
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were most sanguine: 40 percent saw improved stability, while 20
percent did not.70 While majorities or pluralities expressed support
for humanitarian aid, they also stated that the UN (rather than the
United States) should be in charge. Respondents overwhelmingly
disapproved of their own countries contributing troops to the
peacekeeping effort in Iraq.71 This was especially clear in the case
of Kazakhstan, where 77 percent of those polled were opposed to
sending peacekeepers, compared to just 10 percent in favor, an
indication of a public at odds with the government’s decision to
contribute men to this effort.
The Iraq War and Islamic Terrorism in Central Asia.
There is some evidence, since the onset of the Iraq war, of
expanding political activities in Central Asia by pan-Islamic
movements such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and of an effort by the IMU
to reactivate their organization in the region, although regional
analysts dispute the latter.72 Hizb-ut-Tahrir also was important
in anti-war protests in Muslim states outside the region, such as
Indonesia, inviting the possibility that shared opposition to the Iraq
war may contribute to inter-regional networking between radical
Islamic movements in Central Asia and in other countries.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which ﬁrst emerged among Palestinians in
Jordan in the early 1950s, has a radical political ideology---the
formation of a pan-Islamic state that would replace existing regimes
in the Muslim world and recreate the Caliphate---but eschews
violence. The group primarily focuses on propaganda activities,
through the distribution of leaﬂets and, increasingly, internet use.
Despite the group’s rejection of violent change, Russia’s Federal
Security Service (FSB) accuses Hizb-ut-Tahrir of forming links with
separatist ﬁghters in Chechnya, as well as with the IMU.73 Central
Asian security forces and Hizb-ut-Tahrir have exaggerated the
membership in the organization for their own purposes. According
to the International Crisis Group, a human rights organization that
has done extensive research on Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the group is unlikely
to have more than 20,000 members throughout the region. Other
analysts put the group’s membership at 10,000.74
The International Crisis Group (ICG) acknowledges that some
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Hizb-ut-Tahrir members, particularly in Uzbekistan, are dissatisﬁed
with the group’s position on nonviolence, and other regional
observers have noted that the Iraq War led to some discussion
about the need for a more radical approach to broaden the group’s
appeal.75 These appear to be a minority, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir
continues to pursue a gradualist program, involving missionary
work, such as the distribution of print, audio, and video materials
about the group.76 Moreover, ICG downplays the prospect of any
meaningful cooperation between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and other groups,
such as the IMU, since its interventions in Kyrgyzstan and routing in
Afghanistan proved it to be an incompetent ﬁghting force.77
Hizb-ut-Tahrir attracted the largest following in Uzbekistan
(approximately 7,000) because it represented the only serious
opposition group. After the Karimov regime undertook a major
campaign against the group in 1998, mass arrests and show trials
took place. Some 4,200 Hizb-ut-Tahrir members were in prison as of
December 2002, though the party itself claims that more than 8,000
of its members did jail time at one point or another.78 According
to Human Rights Watch, authorities in Uzbekistan tend to charge
religious activists with subversion or antistate activity, punishable
with 20 years in prison. The group documented more than 100 cases
of torture used against such prisoners in 2002 alone.79
In Tajikistan, membership in Hizb-ut-Tahrir is likely to be in
the low thousands, according to the ICG.80 Since 1998, 600 Hizb-utTahrir members have been arrested in Tajikistan and are serving
prison terms of 10-15 years for inciting religious hatred, seeking
to overthrow the constitutional order, and belonging to a criminal
organization.81 Since the beginning of 2003, more than 20 Hizb-utTahrir activists have been detained in Tajikistan’s Sughd Oblast, and
two underground printing operations, with computer facilities likely
to have been obtained through foreign support, were discovered
there.82 While previously Hizb-ut-Tahrir activities were concentrated
in areas bordering Uzbekistan, authorities in Tajikistan are now
concerned that the group’s inﬂuence is spreading southward.83
Kazakhstan has relatively few Hizb-ut-Tahrir members, probably
no more than a couple of hundred since the group ﬁrst appeared in
2000.84 Most of the membership is concentrated in the south of the
country. After the onset of the Iraq War, Hizb-ut-Tahrir leaﬂets in
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Kazakh advocating war against the United States were delivered to
mailboxes in Shymkent, the South Kazakhstan oblast administrative
center. A number of arrests have been made in the oblast for illegal
religious activities, including by foreign preachers.85
In Kyrgyzstan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has a membership of 1,000-2,000,
according to the ICG.86 Estimates from Kyrgyz government sources
vary widely, from 2,000 (National Security Board) to 3,000-5,000
(Committee on Religious Affairs),87 with some sources projecting
more than 10,000 (Interior Ministry). While the group’s activities
have mostly been conﬁned to the south of the country, more recently
reports have been that Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s following had expanded
to the north. In the ﬁrst 6 months of 2003, some 18 activists were
apprehended in the north of Kyrgyzstan, in the Chui, Issyk-Kul, and
Talas regions.88 During the same period, law enforcement ofﬁcials
placed a total of 1,500 citizens under observation for their role in
disseminating Hizb-ut-Tahrir materials. According to First Deputy
Prime Minister Kurmanbek Osmonov, who is also Kyrgyzstan’s
Justice Minister, Hizb-ut-Tahrir wanted to seize power in Kyrgyzstan
and, to this end, had been expanding “its spying and propaganda
activities.” The group was focusing its efforts on recruiting young
people and was forging alliances with other opposition groups, as
well as the IMU and Uighur organizations.89
Osmonov claimed that Kyrgyzstan’s unduly liberal laws and
weakly coordinated security agencies make it difﬁcult to prosecute
members of the group, while human rights organizations, such as the
Geneva-based World Organization Against Torture (OMCT), allege
that Hizb-ut-Tahrir members in Kyrgyzstan “are being targeted for
their religious and political beliefs, [and] subjected to harassment,
arbitrary arrest and detention, ill-treatment, and potentially
torture.”90 OMCT claims that repression of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir party
has increased in Kyrgyzstan since the beginning of 2003, notably in
the period prior to and during the conﬂict in Iraq. The OMCT sent
an open letter to Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev on June 24, 2003,
calling for an end to ofﬁcial harassment of Hizb-ut-Tahrir members.
Thus Central Asian regimes consider independent Islamic
expressions as a political threat and target them widely even though
there is little support for a greater role for Islam in these societies. A
poll of elites in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan revealed
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that 80 percent in each country believed that Islam’s role should
remain the same (70 percent in Uzbekistan, 49 percent in Kyrgyzstan,
59 percent in Kazakhstan) or be reduced (19 percent in Uzbekistan,
32 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 21 percent in Kazakhstan).91 Nevertheless,
repression of Islamist activity, mass arrests, and mistreatment of
prisoners has deepened mistrust between the population and the
authorities. As a result, Islamist groups may gain greater support
in the absence of other means of channeling political support and in
the face of mounting discontent with the pervasive corruption of the
Central Asian governments.92 The U.S. commitment to maintaining
and expanding basing in the region puts the United States in the
position of appearing to side with weakening authoritarian states
seeking to repress societal challenges.
RENEWED GREAT POWER RIVALRY IN CENTRAL ASIA
Regional powers such as Russia and China tolerated U.S. military
presence in Central Asia because of its clear role in supporting the
war in Afghanistan and the struggle against terrorism in the region.
With the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, and especially in
light of opposition in Russia and China to the U.S.-led war in Iraq, a
long-term U.S. military presence in Central Asia is likely to become
a source of friction in U.S. relations with Russia and China. One
year after the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, Russia and China
have taken steps to reassert their own military presence in Central
Asia and to promote regional security cooperation. Moreover, other
regional powers--particularly India--have become more active in
developing security relations with the Central Asian states. While
activities by these powers in the region do not necessarily run at
cross purposes with U.S. security interests there in the short run,
a long-term American military presence may contribute to a more
intensiﬁed struggle for inﬂuence among regional powers.
Russia’s Reaction to Expanding U.S. Inﬂuence.
Despite its initial acquiescence to a temporary U.S. military
role in Central Asia, of all the regional powers, Russia is the least
comfortable with a long-term U.S. military presence in what Russian
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ofﬁcials continue to regard as their sphere of inﬂuence. With the
election of a more nationalistic State Duma in December 2003, this
trend is likely to accelerate. In January 2004, for example, Secretary
of State Colin Powell’s comments in Moscow about the Pentagon’s
plans to shift U.S. military bases eastward led to speculation in the
Russian media that the Washington would seek permanent bases
in the Caucasus in Central Asia. Although Powell contended the
United States would only establish “temporary facilities,” many
Russian observers remained skeptical about American long-term
intentions.93
Thus far President Putin has accentuated the positive, indicating
his support for U.S. actions against the Taliban as well as Russia’s
readiness to cooperate further with the United States in Central Asia,
leaving his ministers to voice Russian displeasure.94 In the past year,
several top Russian ofﬁcials have indicated their opposition to the
indeﬁnite stationing of U.S. military personnel on Central Asian soil.
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that Russia expected U.S. forces
to withdraw as soon as the mission in Afghanistan was completed.95
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called for the UN to regulate the time
frame for the U.S. military presence in the region, which he stated
should be strictly linked to the international peacekeeping mission
in Afghanistan.96 According to First Deputy Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Trubnikov, a former director of Russia’s foreign
intelligence service (SVR), the U.S. military bases in the region are
redundant, given Russia’s key security role in the region, and can
only be viewed as stabilizing insofar as they contribute to ongoing
antiterrorism operations in Afghanistan.97 Long-standing opponents
of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, such as Chief General
Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, assert that Washington is using the war
on terror as a cover for its aim to expand its control over Central
Asian energy resources and interfere in the domestic politics of the
region.98
To counter American inﬂuence in Central Asia, Russia has
taken a series of steps in the past year to strengthen its bilateral and
regional security cooperation in the region and to enhance Russian
control over Central Asian energy ﬂows. In a reminder that Soviet
conceptions of spheres of inﬂuence die hard, at an October 9, 2003,
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press conference, Ivanov revised the January 2000 National Security
Concept, known as the “Putin Doctrine,” to allow for Russian military
intervention in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to
resolve disputes should negotiations fail. Ivanov had already stated
on October 2, 2003, that Moscow did not exclude the possibility of
preemptive strikes to defend Russia’s interests or those of its allies.
At the same October 9 conference, held in honor of German Prime
Minister Gerhard Schroeder’s visit, Putin further asserted Russia’s
intention to maintain its control over the energy pipeline network
in Central Asia, which he characterized as a key Russian national
interest.99 According to a September 2003 agreement on the creation
of the Single Economic Space, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus agreed
to give up some of their sovereign rights to a supranational body in
which Russia has the largest bloc of votes.
The American military foothold in Central Asia made the
strengthening of CIS institutions all the more urgent. Although
Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Belarus
signed a collective security treaty (CST) in 1992, it was not until
May 14, 2002, that the members agreed to enhance coordination
and integration among their militaries by forming a Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), modeled on NATO. At the
CSTO Defense Ministers’ meeting in October 2002, the group placed
a priority on improving collective defense by establishing a rapid
reaction force in Central Asia, with an aviation component stationed
at the Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan. The current force numbers 1,500,
but is expected to double in 2004. Most CSTO members will assign
one battalion each, with Tajikistan contributing two.100 Located 20
km from Bishkek, the Kant aviation force is comprised of Russian
aircraft (including 5 SU-25 ground-attack planes, 5 SU-27 ﬁghter
aircraft, 4 L-39 trainer aircraft, Il-76, Il-18, An-12, and An-24 military
transport aircraft, and 2 Mi-8 helicopters) and currently is supported
by 400 Russian troops, who have relocated with their families.101
The number is expected to grow to 500, but the facility could
accommodate a much larger group of forces.102
In the Soviet era, Kant served as the Soviet Air Force’s main
aviation personnel training ground. Russia is now funding the
reopened base completely, while providing another $3 million
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in small arms and other equipment to Kyrgyzstan.103 Part of
Kyrgyzstan’s outstanding debt to Russia will apply to the
development of infrastructure at the airbase.104 Thus far Moscow has
allocated 79 million rubles to the reconstruction of the Kant base, out
of a total of 219 million required.105 Beginning in January 2004, all
CSTO members will also have the opportunity to purchase Russian
weapons at domestic prices.106
The base is to provide air support to Russia’s 201st division
stationed in Tajikistan. Although the Kant facility is supposed to
be a component of the Collective Security Organization’s Rapid
Deployment Forces, ofﬁcially base personnel belong to Russia’s
Urals Air Force and Air Defense Army. Lieutenant General
Albert Druzhinin, director of the Russian Defense Ministry’s
Administration for Military Cooperation with CIS Member States,
noted that the stationing of Russian forces would enable Russia to
carry out missions on the territories of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan. It is unclear whether the consent of these countries would
be required.107 In talks with President Akaev regarding the opening
of the base, Putin noted Central Asia’s importance to Russia. “While
the situation there is stable, it is not simple. Our military presence is
something both we and our CIS partners need,” said Putin.108 After
some delay, the Kant airbase opened ofﬁcially on October 23, 2003,
the ﬁrst time Russia has acquired a new base since the collapse of
the Soviet Union. At the opening, Putin stated that the new airbase
would help “strengthen the security of a region whose stability is
a growing factor in the international situation.”109 The base will
operate for 15 years and the lease could then be renewed in 5-year
increments.110
In contrast to the Kant base in Kyrgyzstan, negotiations
regarding permanent basing in Tajikistan have been proceeding
with difﬁculty. For some time Russia has sought basing rights for the
201st Motorized Riﬂe Division stationed in Tajikistan, but the two
countries have yet to reach agreement.111 In September 2003, Major
General Nuralisho Nazarov, ﬁrst deputy chairman of the Tajik
Border Protection Committee, announced that the 201st Division,
which patrols the border with Afghanistan, is no longer needed, and
that local troops could do job instead.112 While ofﬁcials in Dushanbe
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disavowed the statement, the 10-year agreement between Tajikistan
and Russia regarding the stationing of the division expired in May
2003 and terms for its extension remain under discussion. Now that
Tajikistan has joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace and has been
expanding security ties with a variety of states, including the United
States, France, and India, Dushanbe has proven to be a harder
bargainer. Although Lieutenant General Aleksandr Markin, the new
Commander of the 201st Division, stated that he expected Russian
forces to remain in Tajikistan for the next 10-15 years, mostly to
combat drug trafﬁcking,113 a number of issues cloud the RussianTajik security agenda. In particular, Tajikistan is displeased with
the 50-50 cost sharing for the division and wants Tajik forces to be
included in meetings between Russian and Afghan border troops.114
In contrast to Tajikistan, which has proven to be less compliant
than expected in recent months, Putin has hailed Kazakhstan as
“Russia’s closest and most consistent ally.”115 Indeed Russia has
had long-standing security interests in Kazakhstan, particularly
nonproliferation and the security of nuclear facilities located in the
country. The Russian uranium industry depends on uranium and
other products from Kazakhstan and Russia leases the Baikonur
cosmodrome.116 Moreover, Kazakhstan has been the most active
participant in CIS training exercises in the Caspian. A defense
agreement with Russia signed in June 2003 provides for training for
Kazakh ofﬁcers at Russian military institutes. Some 800 servicemen
from Kazakhstan now train in Russia, one-third of all CIS military
personnel receiving training in the country.117
The main problem for Russia in Central Asia has always been
Uzbekistan, which remains outside CIS security structures and is a
member of the pro-American GUUAM (an organization made up
of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, and
using the ﬁrst initial of each country to make up the name). With
Uzbekistan’s acceptance of U.S. and German bases on its territory
and support for the U.S. war in Iraq, Russian ofﬁcials have had
more reason to be concerned regarding their loss of inﬂuence with
President Karimov. This may be one reason for the sudden decision
to shift the location of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s
new antiterrorism center from Bishkek to Tashkent. Russia’s main

24

leverage in Uzbekistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, continues to
be its inﬂuence over the region’s energy resources. While less than
pleased with the new Russian base at Kant, Uzbek ofﬁcials have
been seeking Gazprom’s investment in exploring new gas ﬁelds in
the country and in modernizing its pipeline network.118
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two main powers in Central Asia,
and rivals for inﬂuence in the region, have been the most wary of the
new competition for inﬂuence there between the United States and
Russia. For poorer and smaller Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, increased
attention from Washington and Moscow means more resources and
an improved bargaining position. To stay in the good graces of both
benefactors, the Kyrgyz government has accentuated the need for
Russian-American cooperation in Central Asia.119 President Akaev
insists that his country has no intention playing Russia and United
States against each other, and that, to the contrary, Kyrgyzstan has
an interest in friendly relations both with Russia and the United
States.120 Despite Russian concerns about its declining inﬂuence
in Central Asia against a background of rising U.S. clout, CSTO
Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha pledged his intention to
cooperate with NATO, the UN, and the Organization for Security
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in regional antiterrorism and drug
interdiction activities and proposed that Kyrgyzstan could be a
model for such security cooperation.121 The United States and Russia
already cooperate in the region via the Caucasus and Central Asia
subgroup of the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism.
China, the Uighur Issue, and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.
While Russian-American competition for inﬂuence is a relatively
new phenomenon in Central Asia, China and Russia have been
eyeing each other warily in the region for decades. Even as RussianChinese relations evolved into a strategic partnership by the
mid-1990s and the need for conﬁdence-building along the border
between China and the countries of the former Soviet Union led
to the creation of the Shanghai 5 mechanism (the precursor to the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization formed in 2001 by Russia, China,
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and its three Central Asian neighbors, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan, plus Uzbekistan), Russian ofﬁcials have reacted coolly to
China’s attempts to expand its inﬂuence in Central Asia.
Now that its borders with its Central Asian neighbors have been
demarcated, for the most part, China has two primary interests
in Central Asia: economic cooperation, particularly in the energy
sector, and antiterrorism--both of which have important political,
economic, and security implications for the development of China’s
West, particularly Xinjiang province. Trade between China and
Central Asian states has grown steadily during the past decade, but
remains small--total turnover between China and all ﬁve Central
Asian states was less than $30 billion in 2000.122 Cooperation in the
energy sector, however, promises to create long-term economic links
between China and Kazakhstan, in particular. China has been a net
energy importer since 1993 and is seeking to diversify its supply.
While projects in Kazakhstan have faced many obstacles, Chinese
companies are seeking to expand their investments in the country
and to move forward with long-standing pipeline projects. In an
indication of Kazakhstan’s importance to Chinese foreign policy, the
country was one of the three that China’s new president Hu Jintao
chose to visit during his ﬁrst foreign tour in June 2003.123
Since the Central Asian states achieved independence, Chinese
policymakers have been concerned that Uighur separatists,
struggling for greater autonomy in Xinjiang, would seek to use
neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as staging grounds for
their activities, and that Islamist militants in the region would
radicalize the Uighur opposition movement. Consequently, even
before 9/11, Chinese leaders made cooperation against terrorism,
separatism, and religious extremism a fundamental aspect of
bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Central Asian states.
These efforts have found resonance with Central Asian leaders,
who deﬁne radical Islamic opposition movements broadly to justify
crackdowns on domestic dissent.
Since 9/11, however, Chinese ofﬁcials have sought to gain
greater international legitimacy for their efforts to crack down on
Uighur separatists. On December 15, 2003, the Chinese Ministry of
Public Security formally identiﬁed four Uighur organizations as
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terrorist as well as the names of 11 wanted Uighur terrorists, the
ﬁrst such “terrorist list” provided by the agency. The list includes
the Xinjiang-based Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (which the
United States and the UN agreed last year to designate as a terrorist
organization at China’s behest), the Eastern Turkestan Liberation
Organization (founded in Turkey in 1996), the World Uighur Youth
Congress (founded in Munich, Germany, in 1996), and the East
Turkestan Information Center (also founded in Munich in 1996,
with an ofﬁce in Washington, DC).124 Many international observers
dispute Chinese claims linking these groups to terrorism.125 For their
part, Uighur activists contend that Chinese ambitions in Central
Asia pose the greatest threat to the region, not Islamic militants.126
To refute such claims, in May 2003 the Chinese government issued a
White Paper on Xinjiang, which denounces separatist claims, while
asserting the legitimacy of China’s sovereignty over the province
and portraying the region’s inhabitants as living in prosperity and
ethnic harmony.127
International observers have speculated for some time about
China’s purpose in raising the alarm about Uighur terrorism since 9/
11. According to retired GRU (the Soviet military’s main intelligence
service) ofﬁcer Vladimir Suvurov, Kazakhstan allows some Uighur
separatist organizations to operate legally as a hedge against possible
future Chinese territorial ambitions. He noted that the Soviet Union
helped set up the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan in
Almaty in 1975--during the heyday of Sino-Soviet confrontation--as
a means of subverting Xinjiang.128 Other analysts argue that China
exaggerates the connections between Uighur groups and terrorist
activities as a means of preventing them from attracting sympathy
in Central Asia and pressuring the leaders there to crack down on
the organizations.129
According to the Hong Kong Economic Journal, Beijing has come
to view the Uighur movement as a threat to its political security
because these groups, many of which are based overseas, have the
potential to question the legitimacy of ethnic integration in China.
While questions remain regarding the intensity of the terrorist
threat the Chinese government claims the aforementioned Uighur
organizations pose, there is no denying the seriousness with which
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Beijing approaches the issue. In response to the “Uighur threat,”
the Ministry of Public Security has established three criteria for
identifying a terrorist organization (which may be based in China
or overseas): 1) using violent means to harm national security;
2) disrupting social stability; and, 3) harming the lives, property,
and security of the Chinese people. Chinese intelligence services
reportedly have also stepped up their efforts to inﬁltrate the Uighur
groups in Xinjiang.130
China views its bilateral relations with its Central Asian states
as a key component of its antiterrorism strategy. The Chinese
government has signed agreements with all of its Central Asian
neighbors pledging cooperation in ﬁghting terrorism, extremism,
and separatism. On October 10-11, 2002, China participated in joint
antiterrorism exercises in Kyrgyzstan, the ﬁrst time the Chinese
military has ever taken part in such an activity on foreign soil. China
also has begun providing military aid to Kazakhstan, pledging
$3.5 million to the country’s army in December 2002, as well as
more limited aid to Kyrgyzstan. In December 2002, China and
Kazakhstan also signed an agreement on preventing dangerous
military activities near their borders. Displaying Chinese concern
regarding the expansion of U.S. and NATO security interests in the
region, this agreement obligates China and Kazakhstan to share
information regarding the conduct of military exercises and other
military activities on their borders.131
More than any other member, China has pinned its hopes of
regional inﬂuence, particularly over the development of a regional
antiterrorism capacity, on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO). According to Pan Guang, Director of the Center of Shanghai
Cooperation Organization Studies of the Shanghai Academy of
Social Sciences, the SCO’s failure thus far to meet expectations
was the logical outcome of a number of factors. He noted that it
was understandable that the United States sought leadership of
the antiterrorism struggle in Central Asia in response to an attack
against American interests. Furthermore, Pan Guang pointed out
that the SCO was not yet operational on 9/11 and, in any case, is not
a military organization. Moreover, SCO members belong to different
collective security organizations, including the CIS and NATO, and
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faced different requests for assistance from the United States.132
Despite its marginal contribution to the antiterrorism struggle
to date, Chinese ofﬁcials and scholars continue to hail the SCO’s
promise as a regional security organization.
After signing a charter in June 2002 and agreeing in June 2003
to set up a permanent secretariat in Beijing and an antiterrorism
center in Bishkek (since transferred to Tashkent), the SCO has ﬁnally
moved forward with some activities. In January 2004 the Secretariat
formally opened in Beijing and the executive committee for the
regional antiterrorism center also began work in Tashkent, although
the ofﬁcial opening will not be until later in the spring.133
On August 6-13, 2003, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan held a two-phase joint military exercise in
Kazakhstan’s Ucharal, on the Chinese border, and in Ili, in China’s
Xinjiang province. More than 1,000 troops from the ﬁve countries
took part in “Coalition 2003,” the ﬁrst multilateral military exercise
carried out by the SCO.134 Uzbekistan declined to participate,
focusing instead on its own exercises in the Surkhandarya region,
near the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.135 Kazakhstan,
which also took part in the Steppe Eagle-2003 exercises with NATO,
has stated that it opposes further large-scale military exercises under
the auspices of the SCO, which may create a “mistaken impression”
in the international community.136
A New Role for India.
Great power competition for inﬂuence in Central Asia is nothing
new, but since 9/11 the number of participants in the “Great Game”
has increased. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan are members of the Central
Asian Economic Cooperation Organization, which is focusing on
rebuilding Afghanistan. India has emerged as a new player in
Central Asia’s regional security and is building its ﬁrst military
base outside the subcontinent, 10km northeast of the Tajik capital
of Dushanbe. Indian troops will be stationed at the base to provide
training and protect India’s expanding energy interests in Central
Asia.137 On August 2-5, 2003, India and Tajikistan conducted their
ﬁrst joint staff and airborne military antiterrorism training exercises
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at the Fakhrobod training camp south of Dushanbe.
India ﬁrst became involved in Central Asian security during the
2001 war in Afghanistan by opening a hospital in Farkhor, Tajikistan,
which was later moved to Afghanistan after the establishment of the
Karzai government. As a result, Tajikistan became India’s point of
entry into the region and Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes
has sought to build on the relationship to develop military-tomilitary ties.138
There are some natural afﬁnities since Tajikistan uses Soviet
military equipment, long the staple of the Indian military, and the
two countries share overlapping geopolitical concerns regarding
neighboring Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan. In the coming
year, India will train more of Tajikistan’s military personnel
than will Russia. While 600 cadets from Tajikistan now study in
Russia; in 2004, just 30 will be sent there, compared to 40 in India.
Nevertheless, Tajikistan’s Defense Minister Zarubiddin Sirodzhev
claims that Russia remains his country’s strategic partner,139 and,
in fact, both India and Russia now point to Central Asia as an area
of cooperation. During the Russian President’s December 2002 visit
to India, Vladimir Putin and Atal Behari Vajpayee decided to form
a joint working group on terrorism and noted the importance of
stability in Central Asia.
Despite its initial focus on Tajikistan, India is interested in
expanding its security cooperation with other Central Asian states.
India and Kazakhstan signed an inter-governmental agreement
on ﬁghting terrorism. Uzbekistan produces and repairs Il-78 MAR
transport aircraft for the Indian military. India has also been lobbying
for membership in the SCO, with Russia’s support.
While India and China have been improving their relations
in recent months, China has not welcomed Indian efforts to join
the SCO, and, in many respects the two neighbors are squaring
off as competitors in Central Asia. Indian business views the
region as a potential market for India’s strongest sectors, such as
pharmaceuticals and information technology, as well as consumer
goods, which would provide an alternative to the widely available
low-end Chinese products. India’s political leaders also are keen to
promote their model of democratic development in Central Asia both
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to prevent the spread of Islamist terrorist movements, with roots in
Pakistan, and to counter Chinese efforts to encircle India through
strategic cooperation with its neighbors. Russia has supported
greater Indian involvement in Central Asia, in part to check China’s
effort to expand its economic and political inﬂuence in the region.
THE BROADER POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. SECURITY
COOPERATION WITH CENTRAL ASIA
Expanding U.S. engagement with Central Asia has done little
to promote democratization in the region. To the contrary, Central
Asian governments (especially Uzbekistan) have interpreted their
new signiﬁcance to the war on terrorism as carte blanche to repress
domestic opponents. Commitment to democratization in Iraq, while
relying on authoritarian Muslim regimes elsewhere to prosecute
the war on terrorism, reveals inconsistencies in U.S. policy that
have not been lost on increasingly skeptical Central Asian publics.
While Central Asian support for operations in Afghanistan remain
important for antiterrorism operations in that country, human
security problems are the most signiﬁcant for regional stability
within Central Asia and the U.S. Army should do more to address
these needs.
Human Rights Implications.
In contrast to previous administrations, which have viewed the
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conﬂict as the key to fundamental
change in the Middle East, the Bush administration has focused on
antiterrorism and nonproliferation, with the broader aim of spurring
a process of democratization throughout the region. The Muslim
states of Central Asia have played an important supporting role, by
facilitating the routing of al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, but because of
their strategic importance in this respect, their own serious lapses in
human rights largely have been overlooked. Much like the Cold War
era, when the United States cooperated with authoritarian states
against communist regimes, today the United States distinguishes
between rogue states, destined for regime change and requiring
democratization, and coalition partners, such as the Central Asian
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states, equally far from the democratic standard.
Uzbekistan has been an especially egregious example of the
double standard in U.S. foreign policy. By law, the State Department
must demonstrate that Uzbekistan is making progress in human
rights and democratization for it to continue to receive U.S.
assistance. Human rights organizations such as Human Rights
Watch have sharply criticized the State Department’s evaluation
of progress in Uzbekistan and pointed out that signiﬁcant setbacks
outweigh limited progress achieved, particularly regarding the use
of torture and religious and political persecution.140
In recognition of Uzbekistan’s failure to improve its human rights
record, in January 2004 the State Department refused, for the ﬁrst
time, to provide the certiﬁcation required to release assistance for
nonproliferation programs under the Nunn-Lugar Act, a move that
reportedly angered the Karimov government. Although the State
Department ﬁnally called attention to Uzbekistan’s lack of progress
towards its human rights commitments, this was largely a formality
because the Nunn-Lugar legislation included a provision for a
waiver in case national security considerations outweighed human
rights concerns. Since Uzbekistan produces uranium, necessary for
nuclear weapons production, President Bush waived the human
rights certiﬁcation.141 The remainder of security assistance programs
for Uzbekistan, provided under other legislation, require additional
State Department certiﬁcation in the spring of 2004, which is likely
to be granted.
Other states have followed the U.S. lead in focusing on
antiterrorism in policy towards Central Asia. British Ambassador
Craig Murray found himself in political trouble in London after
making a controversial speech accusing President Karimov’s
government of boiling two political opponents to death.142 Murray
returned to London brieﬂy, allegedly for medical reasons, amid
reports that the British government wanted him to resign because
his straight talk was causing tensions with Washington. Ultimately
Murray returned to his post in Uzbekistan.
Now that the United States and the UN have recognized the
East Turkestan Liberation Movement as a terrorist group, Chinese
authorities have been pursuing Uighur activists within Central Asia
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as a part of their crackdown on Uighur terrorism. Human rights
groups contend that Central Asian governments have allowed the
Chinese to deport Uighur residents without due process. While the
Central Asian states have signed extradition treaties with China,
deported Uighurs are likely to be subject to unfair trials, and possibly
torture and execution.143
Central Asian leaders learn from such behavior that as long as
they can play a key part in the struggle of the great powers against
terrorism, their patrons will pay lip service to democratization and
will not require them to carry out their pledges for political reform.
This carries a political price--if Central Asian elites expressed some
skepticism about the real motivations of the United States in the
Iraq war, in part this can be attributed to the inconsistency between
stated U.S. policy goals of economic and political reform in Central
Asia and the realpolitik driving relations. According to a December
2003 International Crisis Group study, few in Central Asia believed
that bringing democracy to Iraq was a real goal of the U.S.-led war
(6.4 percent in Uzbekistan, 11.6 percent in Tajikistan, and 4.3 percent
in Kyrgyzstan).144 Thus, 2 years into the war on terrorism, Central
Asians have concluded that the U.S. commitment to democracy lags
far behind the priority placed on antiterrorism cooperation with
authoritarian leaders in the region and on its own strategic interests
in securing access to oil supplies.145
A REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR HUMAN SECURITY
While the Bush Administration continues to view its Central
Asia policy within the prism of the global war on terrorism, many
U.S. experts dispute that terrorism is the primary security concern
in the region. Instead of focusing on the potential for a resurgent
IMU or a violent Hizb-ut-Tahrir, they note that underlying
problems in Central Asia, particularly severe poverty in Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan, narcotics trafﬁcking fueled by corrupt regimes
throughout the region, the potential for conﬂict among the Central
Asian states themselves over scarce water supplies and other
resources, and the prospect of radicalized populations in the face of
the refusal of regional governments to allow citizens greater public
participation and accountability could create the conditions for state
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failure in which terrorist groups thrive.146
Phil Williams, contributing to a RAND study on faultlines
in Central Asia, writes of a “criminalizing syndrome” that risks
radicalizing an increasingly impoverished and alienated population.
The criminalization of the socio-economic environment results from
the involvement of the Central Asian states in drug trafﬁcking, the
intrusiveness of organized crime in these societies, the scale of the
shadow economies in the region, and the prevalence of corruption.147
The Central Asian states rank among the most corrupt, according
to Transparency International’s 2003 survey of 133 countries.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan rank 100th, while Kyrgyzstan is 118th,
and Tajikistan is 124th.148
While the U.S. Government does provide assistance for a variety
of socio-economic programs for Central Asia, this has not translated
into greater inﬂuence over political and economic change in these
governments.149 Moreover, Central Asians remain skeptical that
such assistance will beneﬁt them given the pervasive corruption and
lack of accountability of their governments. The December 2003 ICG
study notes that disappointment with donor aid fuels anti-Western
feeling in the region. The group’s public opinion polling reveals that
signiﬁcant numbers of Central Asians fear that Western assistance
has little positive impact or is being misappropriated (30.1 percent in
Uzbekistan, 54 percent in Tajikistan, 27 percent in Kyrgyzstan.)150
The focus of U.S. security cooperation, on bilateral relations
with the ﬁve Central Asian states, faces a conceptual problem. On
the one hand, U.S. policy is too narrow, failing to take into account
the interconnection between these states and their neighbors in the
south Caucasus, South Asia, Iran, Turkey, and western China. In
effect, a “greater Central Asia” needs to be the focus of U.S. policy
efforts.151 Thus, without rebuilding the economy of Afghanistan,
narcotics trafﬁcking will continue to threaten Central Asian regimes.
Sanctuaries for terrorists in Pakistan will destabilize Afghanistan,
as well as its Central Asian neighbors. Lack of progress towards
democracy in China will reinforce similar trends in Central Asia.
On the other hand, U.S. policy falls short of addressing the real
security needs of Central Asian citizens, typically left unprotected
from the predation of their own rent-seeking regimes. In contrast to
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the U.S. focus on terrorist threats to the Central Asian states, placing
a priority on cooperation with the leadership of these countries, the
UN Commission on Human Security advocates a policy framework
that pays attention to the security of individuals and communities.
Based on the principles of the 1994 UN Human Development Report,
calling for freedom from fear and freedom from want, the UN
commission notes that Central Asians face a series of simultaneous,
interrelated political, economic, social, environmental, and military
security threats. To address the region’s human security needs,
the commission argues that the policy agenda must recognize the
interconnectedness of these threats and take a long-term holistic
approach to them.152
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
Prior to 9/11, former CENTCOM head General Anthony Zinni
found himself advocating greater involvement in Central Asia than
policymakers in Washington were prepared to accept, because he saw
the importance of stability in these states for the region as a whole.153
Currently, as American and NATO operations in Afghanistan
continue, the United States faces an open-ended commitment to the
stability of the Central Asian region.154 This is part of general trend
toward an expansion of the military’s role in regional diplomacy.
Increasingly the U.S. military ﬁnds itself employed in ostensibly
political-diplomatic missions, leading the Pentagon to consider
creating a military force dedicated to stability and reconstruction
operations.155
Notwithstanding the strategic importance of Central Asia as a
frontline for operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. military presence
in the Central Asian states has consequences of its own for regional
stability. The Manas base was already the target of a terrorist attack,
foiled by security authorities in Kyrgyzstan in November 2003.156
The Iraq War complicates the U.S. military’s task in Central Asia
by undermining support for the United States among Central Asian
publics and elites, and by reducing resources available to complete
the mission in Afghanistan, the success of the latter itself of critical
importance for Central Asian security. To avoid contributing to the
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further radicalization of the population, the U.S. military needs to
focus more attention and resources on regional human security
needs.157 While there are limits to what can be done in the absence of a
policy framework that is more attuned to the societal underpinnings
of terrorism and state failure, the U.S. Army could devote greater
attention and resources to two programs with important human
security consequences: demining and training in drug interdiction.
In response to attacks by the IMU in 1999 and 2000, Uzbekistan
unilaterally mined its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Another 16,000 mines were emplaced in Tajikistan during the 199297 civil war.158 The mines along the borders between Uzbekistan and
its neighbors pose a direct threat to civilians living in impoverished
peripheries such as Kyrygzstan’s Ferghana valley, where radical
Islamist groups have made inroads. Civilians require access to these
areas for pastureland and wood, as well as to visit relatives across
the border. The economic damage is estimated to be almost $150,000,
according to the United Nations.159 The mines have killed more than
200 civilians since 2000, while maiming hundreds more.
The OSCE and the Swiss Foundation for mine action have just
initiated a project in Tajikistan to clear mines from 2,500 square km
of land and 700 km of roads at a cost of 500,000 euros.160 Tajikistan
estimates that it would require an additional $13.6 million to
eliminate the remainder of the mines on its territory.161
The United States does not yet offer humanitarian mining
assistance to Central Asia. The U.S. Army’s participation in such a
program would contribute greatly to human security in the region
and provide tangible evidence to the population of the positive role
the U.S. military can play in improving regional stability for ordinary
citizens.
Moreover, a demining program focusing on the mines unilaterally
laid by Uzbekistan on the borders with its neighbors would
demonstrate to the Karimov government that it cannot achieve its
own security at the expense of its neighbors. Some experts note
that Uzbekistan’s heavy-handed interventions in the region and
repression of political opponents at home have contributed to the
radicalization of opposition movements in the region.162
In addition to demining, the U.S. military should do more to
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address the problem of drug trafﬁcking in the region. Since terrorist
movements earn their revenues from criminal activities, such as
narcotics production and trafﬁcking, such efforts are directly linked
to antiterrorism goals. In 2002, the United States allocated $22 million
for antitrafﬁcking initiatives. While the United States continues to
fund programs for interdiction, experts contend that Washington
could do more.163 Because the United States has small embassies in
Central Asia, Washington relies on other organizations such as the
UN Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime to take the lead.164 Nevertheless, the
U.S. Army could expand its training programs for drug interdiction
as a part of its other military-to-military cooperation programs in the
region.
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